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ABSTRACT
There are numerous examples of assets with identical payout streams being priced
differently. These violations of the law of one price result from two factors. First, in-
vestors have heterogeneous asset valuations so that if two groups of investors trade in
segmented markets they are likely to set different prices because they have different ex-
pectations as to the value of the identical assets. Second, such discrepancies can only
persist if arbitrage activities are limited. There appear to be two major limitations, short
sales constraints and noise trader risk. Those assets facing short sales constraints have
an asymmetric distribution of pricing violations because short sales constraints only bind
when asset prices are too high. By contrast, assets facing noise trader risk have symmetric
violation distributions because noise trader risk must be born by arbitrageurs both when
prices are too low as well as too high.
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I. Introduction
The orthodox Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) rests
upon the assumption that Sharpe calls “homothetic expectations.” This is the idea that rational
investors, if exposed to the same information set, will come to the same estimate about a given
asset’s future payout distribution. Consequently, the only differences in behavior that we will
see among investors will be the result of differences in their respective risk aversions. Indeed,
in the CAPM world, there is no disagreement about asset prices, as all investors, seeing the
same information, price each asset in the same way—on the basis of how much marginal risk
a marginal amount of an asset adds to the total riskiness of a diversified portfolio.
Three well know conclusions follow from the CAPMmodel. First there should be very low
volume seen on stock markets. Second, all investors will choose to hold the market portfolio.
Third, the rate of return on an asset should be governed by its correlation with the market
portfolio.
Each of these three famous predictions of the CAPM model fails spectacularly in prac-
tice. There is extremely high volume in the asset markets. Very few investors choose to buy
the market portfolio. And, at least ex post, asset returns are very poorly predicted by their
correlation with the return on the market portfolio.
Miller (1977) presents a very different mechanism for the determination of asset prices, a
model which can explain the failure of the three CAPM predictions.1 However, the focus of
this paper will be on the ability of the Miller (1977) model to explain why financial markets
feature so many instances of the violation of the most fundamental implication of rational
asset pricing theory, the law of one price. Each violation involves two assets that trade at
different prices despite having identical future payout streams. As will be discussed below,
such arbitrage violations are impossible in the presence of homothetic investors, but are more
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likely than not in the Miller (1977) model’s world of heterogeneous investors segmented into
different markets.
The greater data availability of recent years has lent strong empirical support to Miller
(1977). Additionally, formal models including the two-period model of Chen, Harrison, and
Stein (2002) and the full intertemporal treatments of Duffie, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2002)
and Gallmeyer and Hollifield (2002) will hopefully convince the profession that Miller’s in-
sight, now that it has been made mathematically precise, is a robust alternative to the CAPM
orthodoxy which has aged poorly.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses Miller’s model,
it subsequent formalization by other authors, and the evidence in support of it. Section III
demonstrates that Miller’s model can explain each of the most famous violations of the law
of one price, including the ARCO/Exxon price divergence, the Royal Dutch/Shell price diver-
gence, the Palm/3Com carve-out anomaly, the asymmetric failure of put-call parity, and the
existence and behavior of discounts on closed-end mutual funds. Section IV discusses the re-
lationship between the definiteness of the arbitrage horizon and the willingness of arbitrageurs
to risk capital when encountering violations of the law of one price. Section V concludes.
II. The Miller Model of Asset Pricing
Miller (1977) views asset pricing as an auction in which the finite number of share issued by
a company go to those investors having the most optimistic expectations about the company’s
future profitability. As with most auctions, this leads to a winner’s curse, with those most
optimistic often overpaying for the asset.
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Miller’s model is predicated upon investors having heterogenous expectations. By con-
trast, traditional asset pricing assumes that each rational investor, having access to the same
information set, will come to hold the same beliefs about an asset’s future payout stream as
every other investor. This consensus implies that they will agree on the price at which that
payout stream should be currently valued. Miller (1977) disputes this, and in doing so pro-
duces a simple model which can account for not only the failings of CAPM but the much more
fundamental issue of why the law of one price so often fails.
Assume that there are N investors. For expositional convenience, let each investor be
limited to one-share positions in the stock of a given company. That is, they can either go
long one share, go short one share, or hold no shares at all. Assume that the investors have
heterogenous beliefs that are common knowledge.2 Next, rank the investors from highest to
lowest, first in terms of their beliefs about the expected returns on the asset, and then again in
terms of the current valuations they assign to the asset. This will give you both a distribution
of investor demands as well as the market demand curve for the investment.
Figure 1 shows the investors’ demand distribution. Those who have extremely positive
expectations demand a few shares on the right end of the distribution, while the more numerous
investors having more moderate expectations demand more shares towards the middle of the
distribution. If the total number of shares available is given by F , then all those shares will be
bought up by the investors having the most optimistic expectations about returns. In Figure 1,
the vertically lined right tail ends up with all the F shares as these investors will outbid other
investors for the ownership rights.
The price determination of the asset can be seen in Figure 2, where investors are lined
up, left to right, from highest valuation to lowest valuation. This traces out a demand curve.
Inserting a vertical supply curve at F units gives the market price of the stock at the intersection
of the vertical supply curve with the downward sloping demand curve.
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In Figure 2, two demand curves are shown, corresponding to two different sets of investor
valuation distributions. Both distributions feature the same mean expected return across in-
vestors, but in the case of the solid line, investors have a greater variance of expectations than
in the case of the dashed line. The result is that when the vertical supply curve is drawn in
at F shares, the market price is higher in the case of greater dispersion of opinions about the
value of the stock. Even though the valuation is the same, greater dispersion of opinion leads
to the steeper solid demand curve and the higher price, PH . Because the fixed stock of shares
ends up being owned by those who value it most highly, when opinions are very dispersed, the
equilibrium price is driven up by the buying of those having extreme valuations.
A crucial point of Miller’s model is that short selling is unlikely to drive an asset’s price
all the way to the mean valuation level. There are three reasons for this, all of them tending
to limit the total amount of short selling that is likely to take place. The first is that there
will likely be relatively few investors who think that shorting will be profitable. Only those
investors who think that the asset’s expected return will be negative will wish to short. Fur-
thermore, our expectationally heterogeneous investors will only desire to short if they believe
that they can make more (risk adjusted) money shorting one particular asset than they can
going long in the assets about which they are most optimistic. In Figure 1, only those in-
vestors in the far end of the left tail, left of zero expected return, will consider short selling.
Second, there is the risk, ever present in the Miller model, that a mispricing will widen rather
than narrow. In terms of Figure 2, an arbitrageur who feels that the price PL is too high may
be discouraged from shorting the stock for fear that the distribution of of investor valuations
may become more extreme, increasing the slope of the demand curve from that of the dashed
line to that of the solid line, thereby driving the price up from PL to PH . This “noise trader
risk” will be discussed extensively below in the section on closed-end funds. Finally, there are
institutional constraints that either ban short selling or make it very costly. The most obvious
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are the outright prohibitions that preclude many mutual funds and institutional investors from
shorting and the collateral and margin requirements that tie up capital when shorting.
For a retail investor, taking a short position means complying with the Federal Reserve’s
Regulation T, which requires retail investors to leave 150% of the value of the shares to be
shorted as collateral to be held by their stock brokers. Until the position is covered, no interest
is received on this collateral (see Duffie, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2002)). What this means
is that a retail investor will only dare to short when he believes that the shorted stock will
fall so far in value as to make up for the opportunity cost of the lost interest that could have
been earned on his collateral. In terms of Figure 1, the number of short sellers would be
even less than the area under the distribution curve to the left of zero expected returns. Only
the extreme left part of the distribution tail would choose to short, as only those investors
expecting substantially negative returns will feel that the short position will make up for the
opportunity cost of interest forgone on the collateral.
Short selling is less costly for major investors such as hedge funds because they are not
subject to Regulation T. They only have to put up 102% of the value of the shorted stocks
as collateral. Furthermore, they also receive interest payments on the cash they put up as
collateral. Because of this, major investors would presumably be more willing to take up short
positions. But as documented by Geczy, Musto, and Reed (2002), the greater the potential
gains to shorting, the less interest they receive on their collateral.
The collateral put up by short sellers is considered a type of loan made by the short seller
to the share lender. Because the collateral is a loan, interest must be paid to the short seller
putting up the collateral (i.e., making the loan). The interest rate that is paid is referred to
as the “rebate rate” because the borrower in effect rebates to the lender some of the money
he is earning by investing the collateral. Being a callable, short-term loan, the rebate rate is
normally near the money market rate so that the short seller gets paid a fairly decent rate of
5
return on his collateral and is not subject to large opportunity costs while holding an open
short position. But when a stock is in great demand by short sellers, those lending shares
can negotiation to pay lower rebate rates. As a result, short sellers of stocks that are in great
demand for shorting purposes end up receiving very little (and sometimes even negative) rates
of return on their collateral. This mechanism serves to reduce the amount of short selling
activity seen in the markets. Only those major investors who believe that a stock’s price will
fall enough to cover the opportunity costs of shorting will dare to short. And if there is great
demand to borrow shares for shorting, those opportunity costs will rise.
The net effect of these restraints on short sellers is that the price of a stock will be driven
down less far than it would be were short selling more convenient, involved less collateral,
and was less costly in terms of rebate rates. This is illustrated in Figure 3, where F is again
the total number of shares outstanding and S represents the number of shares sold short. F+S
is therefore the total supply of shares sold onto the market. The increase in supply causes
the market price to fall from P0 to P1. But unless the supply increase due to shorting is
substantial, the price will not fall all the way down to PM, the price consistent with the mean
expected valuation across investors.
A dynamic formal model incorporating heterogeneity of investor expectations and costly
short selling has been developed by Duffie, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2002). It shows that not
only can prices remain high in the presence of short selling, they can even rise higher than the
valuation of the most optimistic investor because the market capitalizes in the future revenues
that can be had by lending out shares to short sellers.3 What is more, short sellers in the
model are unable to drive prices down to the levels they consider proper. In the long run, the
price-increasing valuations of optimistic investors keep prices high.
This formalization of the Miller (1977) insight will hopefully direct attention away from
the CAPM model which fails so spectacularly in practice towards Miller’s simple supply and
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demand framework, which is capable of better explaining observed investor and asset pricing
behavior. In particular, it must be noted that Miller’s model can deftly account for the three
famous violations of the CAPM model noted above.
First, we should expect a high amount of trading because investors have heterogenous
beliefs about the future. As the valuation of the marginal investor in Figure 1 changes, so will
the market price. Anything, no matter how irrational, that affects the distribution of investor
expectations, will likely cause trading, as the finite supply of shares will be bid away by those
investors having, at any moment, the most optimistic valuations regarding the asset.
Second, we should not expect all investors to buy the market portfolio because each in-
vestor will have individual beliefs about which stocks are likely to do well in the future. Each
investor’s portfolio will end up being filled with those stocks that each investor is most opti-
mistic about. Unless, by chance, all investors have the same beliefs about all assets, they will
not hold the same portfolio. Rather, they will tend to hold those stocks for which they are
members of the optimistic, far right tail of the expectations distribution.
Third, we should not expect the return on an asset to vary proportionally with its correlation
with the market portfolio. Under the Miller model, capital returns on individual assets will be
determined by how much the changing valuation of the changing marginal investor changes
the market price of the asset. This price variation need not be correlated with the return on the
market portfolio. That is because the market return is itself merely the sum of the returns on the
assets comprising the market portfolio, and each of those returns is itself caused by changing
marginal investor valuations. There is no reason to believe that the changing valuations of
one asset will necessarily be correlated with those of any other asset or with the sum of the
changing valuations across all assets.
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The greatest strength of the Miller (1977) model and its subsequent formalizations is its
ability to explain why the most basic implication of rational asset pricing, the law of one price,
is so often violated. The next section applies the Miller (1977) model to five well known
violations.
III. Famous Violations of the Law of One Price
Each of the most famous asset pricing anomalies is a violation of a no-arbitrage condition. In
every instance, one can show that two assets with identical future payout streams have differ-
ent current prices. This is, of course, not possible under CAPM. Because the rational investors
of the CAPM model agree that the two payout streams are identical, they never even attempt
to give different prices to the two assets. Put slightly differently, market segmentation does
not matter in the CAPM world. If all investors are homogeneous in their expectations, then
even if you divided them into two groups and only let members of the first bid on one iden-
tical asset, and members of the second bid on the other identical asset, both assets would be
priced identically. By contrast, segmentation matters greatly in the presence of expectational
heterogeneity.
To see this, divide a group of heterogeneous investors in half, into a pessimistic half and
an optimistic half (e.g., the left and right halves of the symmetric distribution of Figure 1). If
you then set the two groups to bidding in separate markets on identical assets, the equilibrium
prices will be different, with the price among the pessimistic investors being less than the price
among the optimistic investors.
There are many examples of assets with equal future payouts having different current
prices. Several of these will be discussed shortly. Each instance can be explained by heteroge-
neous investors being segmented into bidding the two identical assets to different prices. What
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is more, the observed price differences do not appear to be rapidly erased by arbitrage. That is,
when two assets with identical payout streams are given different prices by segregated groups
of investors with different levels of optimism or pessimism, arbitrageurs appear to be slow to
force prices to parity. Two factors appear to account for this. The first is the reduction of short
selling caused by outright bans on shorting, the large collateral requirements involved, and
the difficulty and delay often involved in merely locating shortable shares. The second is that
noise trader risk appears to greatly limit the amount of capital that arbitrageurs are willing to
commit to either long or short positions, as will be discussed extensively below in the section
on closed-end funds.
We now turn to five of the more famous “anomalies” of behavioral finance and explain
how each of them is well explained by the Miller (1977) model of segmented, heterogeneous
investors bidding for shares in the presence of short selling and noise trader risk.
A. ARCO, Exxon, and Prudhoe Bay
Norman (1971) relates how the market price of Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO) increased
much more than that of Exxon after the discovery of the rich Alaskan oil field at Prudhoe
Bay—despite the fact that the two firms had equal half interests in the field. This is a clear
violation of the law of one price, but one that is consistent with segregated groups of investors
having different levels of optimism about the expected returns from developing the Prudhoe
Bay deposits.
According to Oswald (2001), the initial announcement of the discovery was made in an
ARCO press release in March, 1968. Figure 4 shows that this is the month in which one
sees ARCO’s share price begin to rise rapidly.4 That same month, Exxon’s price rises only
marginally. In subsequent months, their divergence is even more extreme. In April, Exxon’s
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price actually falls while that of ARCO continues to rise. When a second ARCO press re-
lease announces in June that a second gusher at Prudhoe Bay confirms that the deposit is the
largest ever in North America, ARCO’s price continues to skyrocket so that between the end
of February and the end of July its share price increases from $98.375 to $184.00. During that
same period, Exxon’s price only increases modestly, from $67.75 to $78.25.
While inconsistent with CAPM and asset pricing models with homogeneous agents, the
divergent behavior of ARCO and Exxon is explainable under the Miller (1977) model. Sim-
ply put, different investors with different valuation distributions caused there to be different
responses to the same information.
Indirect evidence that the investor pools of the two firms were likely substantially different
before the discovery can be seen in Figure 5, which gives the monthly trading volumes of the
two firms around the time of the press releases. During February of 1968, only 86,500 shares
of ARCO were traded, compared to 592,100 shares of Exxon. This suggests that a smaller and
likely different pool of investors traded in the two stocks. Over the next few months, trading
of both issues increased substantially, but that of ARCO grew much faster. The June volume
for ARCO was 421,600 shares traded, while that of Exxon was 1,342,500. In other words,
trading in ARCO increased 387% while trading in Exxon increased just 127%. This by itself
is further evidence that the investors trading in ARCO reacted very differently to the press
releases than those trading in Exxon.
But bubbles burst. The price of ARCO collapsed in August, falling to $91.25, despite the
fact that during the same month price of Exxon rose slightly. One might see in this sudden
collapse the action of arbitrageurs. But it is interesting to note that after August 1968, the
trading volume levels of the two stocks were of the same order of magnitude whereas prior to
March 1968, ARCO’s trading volume was an order of magnitude smaller than that of Exxon.
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As the bubble burst, the two share prices may have come to reflect the same valuation of
the Prudhoe Bay discovery not because of the action of short sellers but because after several
months of trading, the shares of the two companies came to be held by the same group of
investors. This would have eliminated the segmentation that had previously existed between
the owners of ARCO shares and those of Exxon shares. As this segmentation was eliminated,
the same group of investors—and more importantly, the same marginal investor—would have
priced the discovery equally, thereby eliminating the price difference that originally resulted
because the two shareholder groups consisted of different people with different valuation dis-
tributions.
B. Royal Dutch Petroleum and Shell Oil
A second famous asset pricing anomaly also comes from the oil industry. In 1907, the Dutch
firm Royal Dutch Petroleum merged operations with the English firm Shell Transport and
Trading Company LLC. As part of the merger, they agreed to split profits on a 60-40 basis.
Because of this, their stocks should be priced at a similar ratio. Royal Dutch trades both in
the Netherlands and on the NYSE where it is part of the Standard and Poor’s 500 Index, while
Shell trades in London and is part of the Financial Times Stock Exchange Index. Despite being
heavily traded and highly liquid in both markets, Rosenthal and Young (1990) and Froot and
Dabora (1999) find deviations of up to 35% away from the expected 60-40 ratio.5
What is more, the level of deviation seems not to be explainable in terms of fundamental
factors such as exchange rate risk or differences in tax laws. Rather, Froot and Dabora (1999)
find that the share prices of the two companies are highly correlated with the returns of the
markets in which they respectively trade. When the US stock market does well, Royal Dutch
shares do well; and when the UK stock market does well, Shell shares do well.6 This is of
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course not consistent with CAPM or rational asset pricing models, but is again easily explained
using the Miller (1977) framework wherein the price of each company in each country is af-
fected by the level of optimism of the marginal investor in each country. When the marginal
US investor becomes more optimistic about share prices in general, the price of Royal Dutch
rises along with the rest of the US market, and similarly with the marginal UK investor and
Shell shares. Unless the marginal investors in the two countries happen to have similar out-
looks across the full range of available assets, we should not expect that prices of the two firms
will fall in the proper 60-40 ratio.
The deviation of Royal Dutch and Shell share prices away from the 60-40 ratio is often not
only substantial but lingering. It has even defied the best attempts of arbitrageurs to narrow
the gap. In 1998, the infamous hedge fund Long Term Capital Management had to unwind,
at a loss, the $2.3 billion position it had taken in Royal Dutch/Shell. The fund had attempted
to profit by going long the shares of one firm and short the shares of the other, expecting the
gap between them to diminish. As documented by Lowenstein (2000), the fund was forced to
unwind the position as the gap widened rather than narrowed. The lesson to be learned from
this is that changes in the opinion distribution and the valuation of the marginal investor can
overcome the best efforts of short sellers to profit by forcing prices back to proper, arbitrage-
free levels.
This particular type of risk is discussed by Shleifer and Vishny (1997), who point out that
arbitrage activities only work if asset prices move in the “right” direction. In the Miller (1977)
model, the movement of asset prices in such a “right” direction cannot be taken for granted as
there is no sure way to predict how the distribution of heterogenous investor beliefs is likely
to evolve. And given a limited ability to undertake risk, due either to limited time horizons or
limited capitalization, arbitrageurs may be forced to unwind positions at a loss just as they are
becoming more potentially profitable. That is, Long Term Capital Management had to unwind
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its Royal Dutch/Shell position when the gap between their share prices widened. But such an
increase represents an even greater potential profit opportunity. Just as the opportunity got
better, the fund had to liquidate.
In a world in which arbitrageurs face the risk that price deviations may widen rather than
narrow, they will be less likely to commit capital towards undertaking the sort of arbitrage
activities that could force prices to parity. Given this reluctance, we should not be surprised to
see deviations of the Royal Dutch/Shell variety.
C. Palm, 3Com, and Equity Carve-outs
Stark violations of the law of one price are sometimes observed when parent companies sell
off subsidiaries. Such sales proceed in two steps. First, a “carve-out” takes place. This is an
initial public offering at which the parent company sells a fraction of the shares of its soon-
to-be independent subsidiary to the general public. Later, a “spin-off” happens. This is when
the remaining shares of the subsidiary are given to the shareholders of the parent company.
This is done at some pre-designated ratio so that for each single share of the parent company
owned, an investor will receive X shares of the newly independent subsidiary.
The key point is that between the carve out and the spin-off, there are two ways of obtaining
shares of the subsidiary. You can either buy them directly on the secondary market, where the
carve-out shares are now trading. Or you can buy a share of the parent company, knowing
that for each share of the parent company you will soon receive X shares of the subsidiary.
If arbitrage pricing held, then the ratio of the prices of the parent and subsidiary firms stocks
should be at least 1:X, as this ratio equalizes the price of obtaining shares in the subsidiary
through either direct purchase or purchasing shares of the parent company.
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Lamont and Thaler (2001) report that this arbitrage-free pricing ratio was violated several
times during the Tech Bubble of the late 1999’s. The most famous example, reported upon at
the time by the Wall Street Journal and the New York Times, was the case of 3Com Corpora-
tion’s sale of its Palm Computing subsidiary. 3Com sold 5% of Palm to the public on March
2, 2000, at which time it also announced that it would spin-off the remaining shares to 3Com
shareholders by the end of the year at a ratio of 1.5 shares of Palm for each share of 3Com
owned. At the end of the first day of trading, Palm closed at $95.06 per share. At a ratio of
1:1.5, that implied that each share of 3Com should cost at least $142.59. Note that this im-
puted price is a lower bound, as it assumes that the rest of 3Com was worthless. Indeed, given
that 3Com was a successful company, one would have expected it to trade for substantially
more than $142.59. However, the actual closing price of 3Com that day was only $81.81. Not
only is this far less than the minimum no-arbitrage price, it is so low as to be an example of a
“negative stub value.”
The stub value of a firm is the implied stand-alone value of the parent company once it
spins off the remaining shares of its subsidiary. After the first day of Palm trading, the stub
value of 3Com was negative. Given that corporations are limited-liability entities, is should be
impossible for shares to have any price lower than zero. Therefore, the negative implied value
of 3Com was a huge deviation from market rationality.
However, the Palm/3Com example is not unique. Lamont and Thaler (2001) find five other
cases of negative stub values out of a sample of only 18 carve outs. The 18 were all instances
where a parent firm had retained at least 80% of the subsidiary’s shares at carve-out and
had given written announcement that the parent company would spin of all of the remaining
shares. The written announcement also normally declared that the spinoff of all shares would
take place shortly, usually within 6 to 12 months.
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These criteria are very important because they should have tended to reduce the sample to
cases where arbitrage is more likely to take place, thereby reducing the likelihood and mag-
nitude of negative sub values. By telling the markets that a full spinoff will be accomplished
quickly, short sellers will have a more clear picture of the risks involved. In particular, they
know that on the day that the spinoff takes place, arbitrage will in fact force prices to parity—
meaning that their arbitrage position will pay off with certainty on the spinoff date. To see
this, imagine an arbitrageur on March 2, 2000 buying a share of 3Com for the closing price of
$81.81. This will, by the end of the year, entitle him to 1.5 shares of Palm. It also entitles him
to whatever the value of 3Com will be once those 1.5 shares of Palm are spun off. But this
remainder, this stub value, will not be less than zero, as the price of 3Com cannot fall to less
than zero. Given that the stub value on March 2, 2000 is negative, this means that you will
be guaranteed a profit on the spin off day: the stub part of your investment must rise in value
from something negative to at least zero. Done more elaborately, you buy one share of 3Com,
short 1.5 shares of Palm, and wait until the spinoff day. When it comes, your long and short
positions in Palm will cancel out, and you’ll gain whatever the price of 3Com is after the spin
off.
The sample chosen by Lamont and Thaler (2001) is therefore one in which we should be
very unlikely to see negative stub values. Companies that say they will spin off all shares and
give a short horizon for doing so guarantee arbitrageurs that they will be able to make a sure
profit in a the course of just a few months. Consequently, it is quite remarkable that of the
18 firms, fully 6 have negative sub values. Because such a large fraction of carve outs have
negative stub values even under conditions which are unfavorable to negative stub values, it is
perhaps not surprising that Mitchell, Pulvino, and Stafford (2002) are able to find 82 cases of
negative stub values in US equity markets over the period 1985-2000.
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While the phenomenon of negative stub values is inconsistent with the law of one price
and homogeneous investor expectations, it is fully consistent with Miller’s framework. All
that is required to explain negative stub values is for there to be a segmentation between
the investors trading Palm and those trading 3Com and enough barriers and disincentives to
prevent arbitrageurs from quickly forcing arbitrage-free prices.
As with Long Term Capital Management’s failure to force arbitrage-free pricing in the
case of Royal Dutch/Shell, arbitrageurs also failed to rapidly force arbitrage free prices in the
case of Palm/3Com. Whereas Figlewski and Webb (1993) find that only 0.2% of the float of a
typical company is shorted at any given time, huge short selling was undertaken in the case of
Palm and the five other negative-stub companies studied by Lamont and Thaler (2001). In fact,
short interest in Palm peaked at 147.6%, or almost 1.5 times the number of shares outstanding.
But despite such massive short selling, the 3Com stub remained negative for almost two
months after short sales were initiated. This is even more striking when you consider that
shorting cannot begin until 20 days after an IPO, at which time physical stock certificates are
delivered to brokerage houses, which can then lend them out to short sellers. Given that the
Wall Street Journal and the New York Times had published articles on 3Com’s negative stub
the day after the Palm IPO, investors were well aware of the profits to be made by shorting. It
is amazing, then, that the negative stub persisted for almost two months after arbitrageurs had
20 days to prepare to take out short positions.
One can only conclude that there was a massively different distribution of investor valu-
ations among Palm investors and 3Com investors. The difference was so great, in fact, that
massive short selling could only partially rectify the two prices. The short selling did increase
the supply of Palm and drive down its price, but the supply could not increase fast enough to
quickly and fully offset the optimism of the marginal Palm investor.
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D. Violations of Put-Call Parity
Another way to see the inconsistent pricing of Palm and 3Com shares is to examine another
arbitrage condition, put-call parity. To understand this condition, note that the following two
portfolios will have the same payout on the expiration date, T , where today is considered to
be time t = 0. The first portfolio consists of a European call option with a strike price of X as
well as an amount of cash equal to Xe°rT . The second portfolio consists of a European put
option with the same strike price of X plus a single share of the underlying stock. The identical
payout of both portfolios on the common option expiration date, T , will be max(ST ,X), where
ST is the price of the underlying stock on the expiration date, T . Because both portfolios will
have the same payout on date T , they should trade today for the same price. If c is the current
price of the call option, p is the current price of the put option, and S0 is the current price of
the underlying stock, then, the following no-arbitrage condition, the put-call parity condition,
should hold:
c+Xe°rt = p+S0. (1)
Lamont and Thaler (2001) find that Palm options displayed massive violations of the put-
call parity relationship of equation (1).7 What is more, a slightly different no-arbitrage condi-
tion holds that for at-the-money put and call options, the calls should cost more than the puts.8
This condition is also massively violated, with at-the-money Palm puts costing about twice as
much as at-the-money Palm calls on March 17, 2002.9
Since puts give the right to sell in the future, it is clear that the marginal investor in the
options market felt that price of Palm should be much lower than did his counterpart in the
direct Palm shares market. Segmentation appears to have allowed assets with identical payouts
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to have different prices in different markets. This is even more evident if you realize that one
can “synthesize” a share of Palm by simultaneously buying a call, selling a put, and holding
the present value of their common strike price. This portfolio will have the same value on the
common expiration date of the two options as a share of Palm stock. Consequently, the cost
of setting up synthetic long today should equal the present price of Palm stock. To see this,
re-arrange equation (1) as,
c° p+Xe°rt = S0. (2)
Lamont and Thaler (2001) find this condition massively violated for Palm and the other
cases of negative stub values.10 Depending upon the time left until expiration, the price of the
synthetic long position in Palm was up to 23% less than the price of a share of Palm bought
directly. This indicates that the investors involved in the market for Palm options believed that
prices would be much lower on the relevant expiration date than did those investors trading
Palm shares directly.
That the price of a synthetic long position in a stock can differ from that of the underlying
asset is shown by Ofek, Richardson, and Whitelaw (2002) to be a wide-spread phenomenon
that appears to be directly related to how difficult the given underlying asset is to short. Ofek,
Richardson, and Whitelaw (2002) examine the options of all stocks trading in the USA over
the period July 1999 to November 2001. They divide this period up into 118 dates that are
approximately 5 trading days apart and then filter the data on these 118 days by examining
only stocks that are non-dividend paying and which have intermediate-maturity pairs of at-
the-money put and call options of the same expiration date. This gives them 80,614 pairs of
options on 1734 stocks over the 118 weekly trading dates.
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Their first significant finding is that violations of equation (2) are asymmetric. That is,
you are much more likely to find in the data that c° p+Xe°rt ∑ S0 than you are to find that
c° p+Xe°rt ∏ S0. That is, if arbitrage is violated, it is much more likely that the synthetic
long will cost less than the real stock rather than vice versa.
This finding makes sense from the perspective of segmented markets operating under
short-selling constraints. If the price of a stock falls below the price of the synthetic long,
it is easy for arbitrageurs to rectify the situation. They simply go out and buy shares of the
stock, driving up the share price until it equals the price of the synthetic long. Matters are quite
different if the price of the stock rises above the price of the synthetic long. In such instances,
the mechanism that could act to equalize the prices is short selling. But, if short selling is
hampered in any way, this pressure to move towards parity will be limited and convergence
will be slow.
The second major finding of Ofek, Richardson, and Whitelaw (2002) is that as the diffi-
culty of shorting a stock increases, the more likely the price of the underlying is to exceed the
price of the synthetic long. This is evidence that the greater are the limitations on short-sale
arbitrage activities, the more the prices of two identical assets are able to vary because of seg-
mentation and differences in the valuation of the marginal investors trading the two identical
assets.11
Ofek, Richardson, and Whitelaw (2002) utilize rebate rates on short sale collateral as their
measure of the difficulty of shorting a stock. For stocks which are easy to short, the rebate rate
is usually approximately equal the money market rate. However, if there is great demand by
short sellers to borrow the shares of a particular company, then the lenders of such shares can
negotiate to pay lower rebate rates on the short seller’s collateral. Because there is no proper
market for obtaining shares to short, observed rebate rates may not be equilibrium prices in
the sense of equalizing the supply and demand for shares to short. Ofek, Richardson, and
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Whitelaw (2002) argue, though, that their rebate rate data can serve as a good proxy for the
difficulty and cost of obtaining shares to short. Consequently, one should expect to find it more
likely that a stock’s price will exceed the price of its synthetic long if rebate rates are lower
(i.e., if lenders of shares can drive a hard bargain because of the high short seller demand for
their shares.) To test this, Ofek, Richardson, and Whitelaw (2002) match the options pairs in
their data set to a data set containing rebate rates. As expected, they find that the harder it is
to short, as measured by lower rebate rates, the greater is the excess of the share price over the
price of the synthetic long. In fact, an astonishing 12.23% of the 80,614 observations are cases
where the price of the stock is greater than the price of the synthetic long, even after taking
account of transactions costs. Failures of put-call parity are thus probably the most common
and pervasive violations of the law of one price to be found in financial markets.
Synthetic long prices, however, can be greater than, as well as less than, the prices of actual
longs. It is instructive to plot out a histogram of their relative prices. Let S denote the spot
price of a stock, i.e. the price of the actual long. And let S§ denote the price of the synthetic
long for that stock. If the two positions had equal prices, it would be the case that ln(S/S§)
would equal zero.
In the authors’ data set, there were 56,072 options pairs for which rebate rates were near
the market rate of interest and therefore short-sales constraints appeared to be non-binding.
There were an additional 8,699 options pairs for which rebate rates were significantly less
than the market rate of interest and therefore short-sales constraints appeared to be strongly
binding. Figure 6 plots out for each of these two groups a distribution histogram of their log
price ratios, ln(S/S§). The solid line gives the relative frequency distribution for the 56,072
options pairs for which short-sales constraints do not bind. It is narrow and centered on the no-
arbitrage value of zero at which the synthetic long and actual long would have equal prices. By
contrast, the dotted line that gives the distribution of the 8,699 options pairs for which short-
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sales constraints are tightly binding is heavily skewed to the right, with a mode of 0.5, implying
that S/S§ = 1.65, or that, at the mode, prices of actual longs are 65% higher than the prices
of synthetic longs. Another way to measure the effect of binding short-sales constraints on
distributional symmetry is to compare cumulative distributions. When short-sales constraints
do not bind, 47.3% of ln(S/S§) observations are less than zero, whereas only 27.7% are less
than zero when short-sales constraints do bind.
The asymmetric distribution of put-call parity violations suggests that they are well ex-
plained by the Miller (1977) model. One must assume only that the valuation distributions
are different in the options markets and the stock markets. The asymmetry follows directly
upon the imposition of short sale constraints, which make difficult arbitrage activities in cases
where the stock costs more than the synthetic long, but which do not increase the difficulty of
arbitrage in cases where the synthetic long costs more than the stock.
E. Closed-end Fund Discounts and Premia
The role of short selling in constraining deviations between the prices of two assets with
identical payouts is also important for closed-end funds, which are mutual funds whose shares
trade like stock. Because the contents of their portfolios must, by law, be published weekly,
it is possible for investors to exactly replicate the portfolios of closed-end funds, so that they
could obtain the same payout stream either by buying the shares of a fund or by replicating
its portfolio. Consequently, one would expect the market value of a fund’s shares should
to equal the market value of the fund’s portfolio. This no-arbitrage condition is typically
violated: Closed-end funds often trade at substantial discounts and premia to the value of their
underlying portfolios.
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To be precise about these discounts and premia, let Nt denote the net asset value per share
of a given fund. The net asset value (NAV) is simply a fund’s portfolio value less any liabilities
the fund may have; it is the value of the fund. Let Pt be the current price of the fund’s shares
on the stock market. The discount or premium at which the fund’s shares trade is defined to
be Dt = Pt/Nt°1. Values of Dt > 0 indicate premia, while values of Dt < 0 are referred to as
discounts.
Figure 7 shows the discounts/premia at which the shares of the largest closed-end fund,
Tri-Continental Corporation, traded over the period 1980 to 2001. The fund has ranged over
the past two decades from trading at substantial discounts of over -25% to small premia of
about 5%. Even more interesting, changes in Tri-Continental’s discount/premium have often
been very rapid, making them hard to explain in terms of changing transactions costs, changing
tax laws, or other changing fundamentals. Liquidity is also not an issue. Tens of thousands
of its shares trade each day on the NYSE. Portfolio replicability is also not a problem. Tri-
Continental holds only large, liquid stocks in its portfolio.12
The discounts/premia of closed-end funds appear to present a further example of seg-
mented markets pricing identical assets at different prices. But this is not to say that closed-
end fund investors are totally unaware of fundamentals. In fact, they seem to rationally take
into account the fact that funds should trade at a modest discount in order to capitalize out
expected future management fees.13 This can be seen in Figure 8, which plots, for 464 funds
over the period 1985-2001, a relative frequency histogram of the 225,306 weekly discount
and premia observations that fall into one-percent wide bins ranging from a discount of -50%
to a premium of +50%.14 As is clear from the diagram, the mode of the distribution is -6%,
which is very close to the rational discount of -7.2% predicted by the model of Flynn (2002).
This model takes into account management fees, stochastic fund death times, and the fact that
discounts/premia should increase with fund dividend payout rates. The value of the model
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is confirmed by the fact that these three fundamental factors collectively explain 56% of the
cross-sectional variation in fund discounts/premia, as demonstrated by Flynn (2003).
Figure 8 also indicates that deviations of discounts/premia from the rational discount level
of -7.2% are approximately Gaussian, with most of the weight of the distribution concentrated
near the mean. Small deviations are common, but larger ones are progressively more rare.
Many deviations, though, are too far from the mean to be consistent with rational pricing.
In particular, fully 31% of the 224,306 weekly discount observations are of premia. Only
investors who believed that fund managers could beat the market would have been willing
to pay premia to buy into a fund rather than purchase its portfolio directly. In fact, it is the
willingness of investors to buy funds at premia that allow them to come into existence. As
related by Weiss (1989), all closed-end funds are priced at their IPOs at a 10% premium, this
premium being necessary to raise the cash needed to pay the investment bankers for their IPO
services.
Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) provide evidence that closed-end fund investors are dif-
ferent from the investors who directly buy the shares held by funds in their portfolios. In
particular, the shares of closed-end funds are owned almost entirely by small investors while
those held by funds in their portfolios are heavily concentrated in the hands of institutional
investors like pension plans, insurance companies, and mutual funds. If the valuations of the
marginal investors in these two groups are not equal, then we should expect, in the Miller
(1977) fashion, that the prices set by the two groups will also be different. Only the action of
arbitrage will help to equalize valuations and drive funds to trade at the rational discount level
of about -7.2%.
As with the asymmetry of put-call parity violations, however, the inability to sell short
causes there to be an asymmetry in deviations from the rational discount level. In particular,
deviations towards large premia are more common than deviations towards large discounts.
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This is not immediately apparent because the histogram of Figure 8 truncates the tails of the
distribution. It is the case, though, that while the lowest observed discount from 1985-2001
was -66.5%, the highest premium was +205.4%.15
This asymmetry in deviations is likely due to the great difficulty to be had in shorting
the shares of closed-end funds. D’Avolio (2002) examines the market for short sale stock
lending by combining exchange data giving short interest on stocks with a proprietary loan
data base obtained from one of the largest securities lenders in the world, a firm so large
that, in each month over the examined 18-month period from April 2000 through September
2001, its outstanding loan balance was more than 10% of total market short interest. D’Avolio
(2002) reports that 27% of closed-end funds appear not to have been shorted by anyone during
that period, and that of the remainder that had been shorted, 92% were not reported at all in
the loan data base.16 This implies that 27% of closed-end funds may have been impossible
to short by any means, and that of the remainder that were shorted by some investor, 92%
could not have been easily shorted. This is because if large securities lenders do not have
shares available, anyone wishing to short a closed-end fund must deal with the cumbersome
process of asking his broker to run a “locate,” whereby his broker calls around to various
brokerage houses attempting to find out if they have in their inventories any shares available
for shorting. As reported by Duffie, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2002), this process may take
weeks and brokers often cannot locate enough shares for their clients, thereby having to give
them only “partial fills.”
The upshot is that the difficulty of shorting the shares of closed-end funds explains why
extreme premia are more common than extreme discounts. If a fund is trading at an extreme
discount, arbitrageurs can simply buy shares of the closed-end fund on the stock exchange,
thereby driving up their price and reducing the magnitude of the discount. On the other hand,
24
if a fund is trading at a substantial premium, the path that arbitrageurs would like to take—
shorting the fund—is often impossible or at least arduous and slow.
But given the ease of buying closed-end fund shares, why are there still so many observa-
tions of discounts below the median of -6%? Put differently, why is the histogram of Figure
8 basically symmetric, rather heavily skewed to the right? If the ability to buy fund shares
makes the correction of discounts easy to rectify, why do we find so many of them? Their
presence is likely the result of another factor which discourages arbitrage activities between
two segmented groups even when such activities are convenient, quick, and low cost. This
factor is noise trader risk, which was described and formally modelled by DeLong, Shleifer,
Summers, and Waldmann (1990).
A noise trader is an irrational agent whose trading activities are inherently unpredictable.
His trading can, however, affect asset prices. In particular, he can drive the price of Asset A
away from that of the otherwise identical Asset B if he trades only in the market for Asset
A but not in the market for Asset B, which is, instead, totally dominated by rational traders.
Note that this setup is similar to the case of closed-end funds, where, as documented by Lee,
Shleifer, and Thaler (1991), small (irrational) investors dominate the trading of closed-end
fund shares while large (rational) institutional traders dominate the trading of the shares held
in fund portfolios. Flynn (2002) argues that the noise trading in closed-end funds results from
investors ever changing beliefs about the ability of fund managers to beat the market. When
they are more optimistic, fund prices rise and Dt increases. When they grow more pessimistic,
fund prices fall and Dt decreases.
The reason that the irrational fund investors are not fully offset by rational investors—even
when the later have no problems at all taking either long or short positions—is because the
noise traders create a non-diversifiable risk factor that rational traders must take account of.
Specifically, suppose that a fund is trading at a very large discount of -35%. One might expect
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rational traders to buy shares of the fund, as doing so would, at a lower cost, obtain the same
future payout stream as would replicating the fund’s portfolio. But taking such a position in
the presence of noise traders is potentially quite dangerous. The noise traders might become
more pessimistic about the fund, sell its shares and drive down the price of the fund, thereby
causing a capital loss for the rational traders who though buying at a deep discount was a good
idea. The risk of this sort of thing happening is not theoretical. It is precisely what happened to
Long Term Capital Management when the price gap between Royal Dutch and Shell widened
instead of narrowed. And it is an ever-present danger when investing in closed-end funds.
This can be seen by examining Figure 9, which takes from the set of all discount/premium
observations graphed in Figure 8 the subset of discounts between -25% and -20% and sees
how it evolves over time, again grouping discount/premium observations into 1%-wide bins
to form histograms.17 The top graph of Figure 9 gives the initial distribution, the middle graph
the distribution one month later, and the bottom graph the distribution one year later. Any
arbitrageur who hoped to make a safe profit by buying the shares of funds trading at deep
discounts would likely have felt aggrieved because any such undertaking is in fact very risky.
After 1 month, nearly as many of the initial discounts have widened as have narrowed, and
many of them have changed substantially. And after a year the spread is even more extreme.
What figure 9 demonstrates is that noise trader risk is real and quite substantial. And it must
be taken into account by any arbitrageur wishing to make money off the difference between
the price of a closed-end fund’s shares and the cost of replicating its portfolio.
Figure 9 does not, however, give a full appreciation of the true volatility caused by noise
traders. That is because it analyzes what happens to an initial group of discounts as time
passes. Arbitrageurs wishing to take advantage of deep discounts can easily achieve their goal
by buying fund shares in the stock market. As we have see, though, arbitrageurs wishing
to take advantage of deep premia are hampered by the difficulties of short selling. Because
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of this, we should expect to find that noise traders have more of a free reign when funds
trade at premia. This is exactly what is shown in Figure 10, which gives the distributional
evolution of all premia falling initially between +20% and +25%. To ease comparison, the
scaling of the vertical axis of each of the three sub-graphs is the same in both Figures 9 and
10. What we see by comparing the two figures is that the rate of diffusion of discounts/premia
away from initial levels is much faster for premia than discounts. Because it is so difficult
to short, fewer arbitrageurs are in the markets when funds trade at premia. Without their
stabilizing influence, fund prices are more volatile. Viewed slightly differently, a comparison
of the graphs shows that noise trader risk is still substantial even under the volatility reducing
influence of arbitrageurs. Arbitrageurs mitigate but do not eliminate the price volatility caused
by noise traders.
Because rational traders must always fear noise trader risk, they will not take large posi-
tions attempting to drive fund prices to rational levels. They avoid doing so because closed-end
funds do not actually offer true arbitrage opportunities, which by definition are riskless. Such
riskless opportunities come about when one can simultaneously buy and sell identical assets
at different prices. You simultaneously buy at the lower price and sell at the higher price.
The key factor is the simultaneity. With a closed-end fund trading at a deep discount, you
could simultaneously go long the fund and short the underlying portfolio, hoping to profit
from a convergence in prices. But this is not the same as a simultaneous buy and sell. A
long-short position in a closed-end fund hedges every risk except one, noise trader risk. Un-
less noise trader risk goes to zero—unless, that is, all the noise traders go away—risk averse
arbitrageurs will not attempt to fully offset the mispricings caused by noise traders.
A profound consequence of the self-limitation of arbitrageurs in the presence of noise
trader risk is that discounts/premia only very slowly mean revert. This is evident in Figure
11, which plots initial discounts/premia versus discounts/premia 52-weeks later, using one-
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percent wide bins for initial discounts/premia. For instance, all discounts falling between -25%
and -24% were identified and of this subset, the average and standard deviation 52-weeks later
were computed. Because 98.1% of all discount/premium observations fall between -30% and
+25%, ignore outliers by concentrating on the middle of Figure 11. What it clearly shows
is that even after 52 weeks, there is only very weak mean reversion. This can be seen by
comparing the bold average line with the line of dots, which gives what would happen if
discounts/premia showed absolutely no mean reversion. Mean reversion is in fact so slow
that fund weeks where the average discount was -20%, for instance, still had, on average, a
discount of -16.5% after 52 weeks.18
It thus appears that in the face of noise trader risk, a risk which cannot be hedged because it
is by definition uncorrelated with anything else, funds show only the most modest tendency to
correct discrepancies between fund share prices and the value of fund portfolio holdings. This
is an important finding because similar behavior may well occur in other markets.19 If noise
trader risk limits the willingness or arbitrageurs to restore rational pricing, then mispricings
can persist indefinitely, or at least until the segmentation between the two identical assets can
be removed.
As documented by Brauer (1984), closed-end funds sometimes vote to liquidate them-
selves or convert into open-end funds. Either case implies that shareholders will be able to
liquidate their holdings at par with the value of the underlying portfolio. Brauer (1984) finds
that as soon as such decisions are made public, any discount or premium disappears. This is
clear proof that arbitrageurs are ever vigilant. The large discounts/premia seen on closed-end
funds do not arise because arbitrageurs are unaware of the mispricing. They arise because
noise trader risk discourages attempts to arbitrage the price difference. This point is also made
by Mitchell, Pulvino, and Stafford (2002) in their study of negative stub values. They find
that the average time between the first appearance of a negative stub value and its termination
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is 236 days because the high risks involved discourage arbitrage activity. They indeed find
that, net of short selling costs, returns to arbitrageurs are “just barely larger than the risk-free
interest rate.”
IV. Finite Horizons and Arbitrage Limitations
The distribution of arbitrage-pricing violations among closed-end funds is more or less sym-
metric, with there being nearly as many under-pricings as over-pricings. By contrast, most
violations of the law of one price appear to be asymmetric. This is especially true of the
put-call parity violations found by Ofek, Richardson, and Whitelaw (2002). There, the large
majority of violations are of stocks trading for more than, rather than less than, the cost of
constructing a synthetic long position. One is led to ask, Why are violations of the law of one
price equally likely to be on the up side or the down side among closed-end funds while those
of other assets only tend to be on the up side?
The reason that immediately comes to mind is that the inability to short gives rise to the
the large number of up side violations of put-call parity. But I think this misses the point. The
deeper reason is that options contracts are of finite duration.
If a stock’s price is below the cost of constructing a synthetic long, one can guarantee a
profit in finite time by buying a share of stock and going short a synthetic long because the
options involved have well-know, finite expiration dates. By contrast, closed-end funds are
on-going companies. Each fund will eventually go out of business but there is no way to tell
when.20 Consequently, an arbitrageur who wishes to go long the shares of a fund trading at
a discount while shorting its underlying portfolio has no idea how long it will take to realize
a profit. He will eventually profit when the fund eventually either liquidates or converts to an
open-end format because the fund’s shares will then trade at par with the value of the portfolio.
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But in the mean time, the discount can widen and cause him to have to put up more collateral
or even close out his position at a loss, as described in detail by Shleifer and Vishny (1997). In
the presence of noise traders, the chances of this happening are ever-present. And the danger
of noise trader risk applies to both up side and down side violations of the law of one price.
By contrast, the nature of options contracts greatly mitigates these risks. Their finite time
horizons mean that a profit can be make for certain in a certain amount of time. Given the finite
time horizons, the difference in price between the share and its synthetic long is extremely
close to being a pure, riskless arbitrage opportunity. Because puts and calls are in limitless
supply (because investors may write either contract), there is never a problem acting on the
profit opportunity arising when the share price is less than the price of a synthetic long. You
simply buy shares and write synthetic longs. The problem, and the cause of the asymmetry,
arises when the share price rises above the price of the synthetic long. You can easily buy
more synthetic longs, but because shares are in finite supply, anything that makes them hard
to short will limit your ability to execute the arbitrage. Because short selling is in fact hard in
the real world, we are left with an asymmetric distribution of put-call parity violations.
Making it easier for arbitrageurs to short would eliminate the asymmetry by basically
eliminating the right tail of a distribution that mostly has only a right tail. Relatively few
violations of put call parity would remain, on either the up side or the down side. By contrast,
making closed-end funds easier to short would only make the distribution of violations more
symmetric. But it would be largely unchanged, as the uncertain time horizon of closed-end
funds means that any arbitrageur must subject himself to noise trader risk for an unknown
amount of time. In the face of such risk, arbitrage will be limited and noise traders, largely
unchecked, will be able to move prices to either discounts or premia as their changing beliefs
dictate.
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V. Conclusions
Violations of the law of one price are very common. While these violations are incompatible
with the traditional paradigm of rational investors sharing homothetic expectations about asset
returns, they are readily explained if you presume that investors with heterogenous expecta-
tions trading in segmented markets will tend to set differing prices unless arbitrage pressures
are robust.
Empirically, however, arbitrage activities are often not robust enough to equalize prices
across segmented markets. Their limited effectiveness has two principal causes. The first is
short sales restrictions. These manifest themselves as outright prohibitions on shorting, as
large opportunity costs arising from having to put up large amounts of collateral, and as the
difficulty and delay often encountered when trying to locate shortable shares. The second
limitation on arbitrage, noise trader risk, affects both long and short positions. Since it is
by definition an idiosyncratic, non-diversifiable risk, it serves to discourage arbitrageurs from
taking the sort of deep positions that would be necessary to equalize prices across otherwise
segmented markets.
If arbitrageurs know that a violation of the law of one price will be eliminated with cer-
tainty in a finite time period, they will be much more willing to devote capital to eliminating
the violation than if a violation is of uncertain duration. In the later case, parity between the
asset prices could only be maintained by an arbitrageur if he were willing to invest the cap-
ital necessary to counter any deviational pressure, in essence acting as a price fixer standing
ready to buy or sell as needed to maintain equal prices. Because noise trader risk discourages
such activities regardless of the direction of the pricing violation, we find that a symmetric
distribution of violations results when noise trader risk must be borne for an unknown length
of time. By contrast, the distribution of violations in cases where violations will be resolved
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with certainty in a finite length of time is asymmetric, the asymmetry caused by short-sale
constraints which make it difficult to eliminate up-side violations. Were such short-sale con-
straints non-binding, the mis-pricings in such cases would be largely eliminated.
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VI. Notes
1See, for example, Miller (2001).
2This is a key point demonstrating that the results of the model are not driven by any group
having only a vague idea about the beliefs of other investors. In the model, you know when
others disagree with you and by how much.
3This intuition that stock prices can be, in markets with heterogeneous investors and short-
sale constraints, above the present value of expected payouts of even the most optimistic in-
vestor has been developed by Harrison and Kreps (1978), Morris (1996), and Scheinkman and
Wei (2002).
4The share price and volume data for ARCO and Exxon are from the monthly file of CRSP,
the Center of Research in Securities Prices at the University of Chicago.
5Deviations of a similar magnitude have been found for other dual-listed firms. See Froot
and Dabora (1999), Rosenthal and Young (1990), and Bedi and Tennant (2002).
6This covariation of internationally dual-listed shares with local stock markets is confirmed
by Bedi and Tennant (2002) for several Australian/British companies whose respective parts
are listed in Sydney and London.
7Equation (1) holds exactly only for European options, which can be executed only on
their expiration dates. Lamont and Thaler (2001) actually examine American options, which
can be executed any time before expiration. Adjustments can be made, however, to account
for this difference. Mutatis mutandis, put-call parity is still massively violated by Palm shares.
8The condition is S0°X ∑C°P ∑ S0°Xe°rT , where C and P are the current prices of
the American call and put options, respectively. Be sure to assume that the strike price, X ,
equals the current price of the underlying, S0. See pp. 178 of Hull (2000).
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9See Table 6 of Lamont and Thaler (2001).
10Actually, they test the analogous, but slightly different condition which holds for Amer-
ican options. The only difference is that of an early exercise premium, as American options
can, unlike European options, be exercised before the expiration date.
11Further evidence that equities are more likely to be over-priced when short sales con-
straints bind is provided by Jones and Lamont (2002) who find that from 1926 to 1933, shares
with binding short-sales constraints have high valuations and low subsequent returns.
12For a recent comprehensive survey of the large closed-end fund literature, see Dimson
and Minio-Kozerski (1999).
13 Management fees are paid as a percentage of fund NAV, typically at the rate of 1% per
annum. This is very large, especially when one considers that funds typically earn less than
10% per annum on their portfolios. Capitalizing future management fees sums to a large
present value. Footnote 20 shows that funds appear to die off exponentially, at the rate of
3.64% per annum. This implies a half-life for a fund of about 30 years. One can combine
published fee rates with the exponential death model to give a precise estimate of the expected
present value of future management fees. Subtracting these from the NAV of a fund would
cause it to trade at about a -7.2% discount.
14The data used to construct this histogram comes from Weisenberger/Thompson Finan-
cial’s FundEdge data set, which contains time series data on each of the 464 closed-end funds
that traded in the USA and Canada in 2001. Some of these funds were founded in the 1920’s,
others much more recently. So how far back I have time series data varies by fund. Also, the
data set does not contain funds which went out of business prior to 2001. There is therefore
the possibility of some sort of survivor bias. This should not matter for the issues discussed in
this paper, however, as the pricing behavior documented here appears to apply to all funds as
long as they remain active.
15In fact, the positive skewness of the distribution means that its mean, at -4.3%, is higher
than its mode.
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16To put these figures in comparison, note that only 1.8% of S&P 500 companies were never
shorted during this period, and of those that had been shorted, less than 1% were not in the
loan database. D’Avolio (2002) defines a stock to have been shorted if the amount of short
interest exceeds min($10,000,0.01%) of shares outstanding.
17Note that the vertical axis is re-scaled for each of the three histograms.
18Besides indicating that the reversion of discounts/premia to fundamental levels is quite
slow, this figure also indicates that the market is aware of the correct level to which mean
reversion should take place. This can be seen by noting that the line of dots and the bold
average line cross at -6%. After a year, discounts of -6% do not go anywhere on average, while
discounts/premia at other levels converge to this value. The sloth of mean reversion can also
be quantified by running an AR(1) regression of current values of the discount/premium on
those 1 year prior. Assume that discounts/premia are mean reverting to the level D¯. Then they
should follow Dt+1 = D¯+φ(Dt° D¯)+ εt , where φ gives the fraction of the period t deviation
that remains the next year, and εt is a Gaussian shock. We can get empirical estimates for φ
and D¯ by running the regression, Dt+1 = constant+φDt + εt . Our estimated constant will be
equal to D¯/(1°φ). Using monthly discount/premium data for the 464 closed-end funds in our
sample, and estimating the equation using pooled least squares on data covering 1985-2001
gives a constant of -2.19 and an estimated value for φ of 0.64. Using these estimates, we
can back out an estimated value for D¯ of -6.08%. That is, discounts/premia mean-revert to a
discount of -6%, but are so slow doing so that 0.64 of any deviation from the mean remains
after one year.
19To test the noisiness of noise trader risk, I ran Fama French regressions for the 464 funds
in my data set (see Fama and French (1992)). The dependent variable was the return from
the hedge portfolio consisting of going long the shares of a fund and short its underlying.
The average R-squared is a low 0.07, indicating that noise trader risk is truly an independent
source of risk that arbitrageurs will not find easy to hedge. By way of comparison, the average
R-squared from regressions where the only independent variable was the discount/premium
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was 0.10. The systematic tendency for discounts/premia to mean revert is a better predictor
than the Fama-French factors.
20 Regressions of fund death rates on macro variables, market variables, and fund charac-
teristic variables reveal no relationship with the probability of a fund going out of business.
Fund death probabilities also appear to be independent of the age of the fund because they
appear to follow a Bernoulli process. An examination of all closed-end stock funds trading
on the NYSE from 1960 to 1999 reveals that one cannot reject the hypothesis that closed-end
funds die off in a Bernoulli fashion, with an annual death probability of γ = .0364. Let Xt be
the number of funds alive at the start of year t and Ot be the number of those that die during
year t. Assuming that fund deaths are Bernoulli, with death rate γ, the expected number of
deaths in year t is γXt . A Pearson’s Chi-squared test statistic can therefore be constructed as
D2 = ∑1999t=1960 (Ot°γXt)
2
γXt . D2 is distributed approximately χ2 with 1999-1960-1 = 39 degrees
of freedom. Our estimated D2 is 30.52 which is significantly less than than the 90% critical
value of 51.81. We fail, therefore, to reject the hypothesis that fund deaths follow a Bernoulli
process.
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Figure 1. Distribution of Demand Due to Heterogeneity About Expected Returns
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Figure 2. Two Asset Demand Curves, Each Resulting from Heterogeneity of Value Estimates
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Figure 3. Decrease in Asset Price Due to Short Selling
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Figure 4. ARCO and Exxon Share Prices at Time of Prudhoe Bay Discovery
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Figure 5. ARCO and Exxon Monthly Trading Volume at Time of Prudhoe Bay Discovery
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Figure 6. Relative Frequency Histogram of ln(S/S§) for the 56,072 Pairs where Short Sales
Constraints were not Binding and for the 8,699 Pairs where Short Sales Constraints were
Strongly Binding
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Figure 7. Tri-Continental Corporation Discount/Premium 1980-2000
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Figure 8. Distribution of Weekly Discounts/Premia, 1985-2001
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Figure 9. Initial, 1-month Later, and 1-year Later Distributions of all 6,021 Discount Obser-
vations Between -25% and -20%
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Figure 10. Initial, 1-month Later, and 1-year Later Distributions of all 1,250 Premium Obser-
vations Between +20% and +25%
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Figure 11. Initial Discounts/Premia vs. Average and Standard Deviation 52 Weeks Later
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